Pesticide corporations and their trade associations wield tremendous influence on policymakers, both in the United States and on the international stage. As a global network, PAN works with partners to shine a light on the undue access and impact of the pesticide industry on national legislators and regulators as well as in United Nations (UN) policy arenas.
In the U.S., the agricultural input industry maintains a cadre of lobbyists in Washington DC, state capitals to protect their interests. As a special interest lobbying bloc, agribusiness spends over $100 million a year lobbying Congress. They focus on an array of issue areas, from regulatory decisions on specific pesticides to antitrust, patent and tort law. Their efforts influence labeling, food safety, the insurance industry and financial services regulation.
U.S. pesticide policy
In reviewing the health and environmental impacts of pesticide products, EPA relies almost entirely on industry-funded studies that are rarely available for public review. In early 2020, EPA’s rules were changed to strongly favor industry studies over independent science even more than they have in recent decades.
Industry lobbyists meet regularly with regulators to promote their interests. Researcher Carey Gillam documented the impact of these meetings on policy decisions related to Monsanto’s flagship herbicide glyphosate in her 2017 book Whitewash.
Also in 2017, EPA officials held several meetings with representatives from Dow Chemical (now Corteva) just weeks prior to the controversial decision to reverse course on the national withdrawal of the neurotoxic insecticide chlorpyrifos. In 2020, Corteva held several meetings prior to the decision to encourage the EPA to overlook evidence of neurodevelopmental harm caused by chlorpyrifos in the agency’s revised risk assessment.
In 2003, while atrazine was being reviewed, Syngenta lobbyists participated in over 50 closed-door meetings with EPA regulators. No other scientists or stakeholders were invited, the meetings were not publicly announced, and documents about the meetings were only made public by the agency after a lawsuit was filed. Atrazine was subsequently reapproved in the U.S., and the herbicide, which has been linked to increased risk of birth defects and cancer, has recently been reapproved for use.
The “Revolving Door” Strategy
Pesticide industry representatives commonly sit on panels and committees that “advise” regulators. Many of the agrichemical industry’s former executives, lawyers and scientists serve in the government agencies that are charged with keeping watch over their industries. These individuals very often then shift back into the private sector, carrying their relationships with government officials and knowledge of the regulatory system with them.
This “revolving door” may be the most effective form of industry influence; here are just a few of many examples:
- Rebeckah Adcock, who became senior advisor to the USDA Secretary in 2017, was formerly the senior director of government affairs at CropLife America.
- Clarence Thomas, Supreme Court Justice & former Monsanto lawyer did not recuse himself in a case involving his former employer.
- Islam Siddiqui, former pesticide lobbyist for CropLife America, was appointed lead Agricultural Negotiator for the U.S. Office of Trade – despite significant opposition to his appointment.
- Michael Taylor, former Monsanto lawyer & Vice President for Public Policy, served as the Deputy Commissioner for Foods at the FDA. Taylor is famous for having engineered the U.S. government’s agricultural biotechnology policies that favor industry interests during the Clinton administration.
- Ramona Romero, former corporate counsel for DuPont was appointed in 2010 to serve as general counsel for the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Whose science?
As a rule, regulatory agencies don’t have resources to conduct their own scientific analyses. This leaves them, and the public whose interests they are charged with protecting, relying on science that has been funded by the corporations whose products are being evaluated.
Here are some examples of how this arrangement works in practice in the U.S.:
Confidentiality claims: Most safety studies conducted by pesticide companies are shielded from public scrutiny by claims of “Confidential Business Information.” These studies are never published in the peer reviewed scientific literature, nor made otherwise available for review by independent scientists.
Funding faulty science: When independent scientists discovered that atrazine “chemically castrates” male frogs, the company that makes atrazine, Syngenta, paid for a review of the ecotoxicity of the herbicide that concluded atrazine didn’t affect fish, amphibians, or aquatic reptiles. Independent scientists subsequently reviewed Syngenta’s review and found that is was riddled with inaccuracies and was systematically biased.
Cherry-picking data: When multiple studies are available, corporations promote those most favorable to their interests as definitive. For example, endosulfan manufacturers convinced EPA to use an old rat toxicity study as the basis of its dietary risk assessment. However, a newer study in rabbits showed acute toxicity at lower levels. Using the new study would have shown unacceptably high dietary risks to children.
Benefits analysis: Under FIFRA, the law regulating pesticide use, EPA is supposed to weigh the benefits of using a pesticide against the risks. To assess benefits, the agency simply asks pesticide companies and grower groups whether alternatives are available and how much they cost. EPA has no money or authority to verify the information volunteered by industry.
Delay tactics & extended timelines: While EPA has the authority to ban or restrict dangerous pesticides, in practice they have been reluctant to exercise it. Under FIFRA, pesticide manufacturers are afforded so many opportunities to appeal and object to the agency’s decisions, that they can grind any EPA action to a halt. The regulatory histories of lindane, carbofuran, endosulfan, and aldicarb provide telling examples.
Influence in International Fora
From the Montreal Protocol to the Stockholm Convention to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the pesticide industry has a long history of engagement in international fora to protect their interests. Representatives from CropLife International are active participants in all these arenas, working with delegations friendly to their positions (such as the U.S.) to influence proceedings.
One example from 2020 illustrates the scope of this influence on international policy. A representative from CropLife America contacted officials at the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) to express alarm over proposed guidelines from the UN Task Force focused on combating drug resistance that results in thousands of infection-related deaths every year.
According to investigators with the New York Times, CropLife pressed the USDA to ensure that the Task Force recommendations did not include mention of fungicides, despite strong scientific consensus that overuse of fungicidal compounds contributed to drug resistance and is a threat to human health.
“When the Codex Intergovernmental Task Force on Antimicrobial Resistance met in South Korea several months later, the American delegation insisted that the guidelines omit any references to fungicides, a stance that infuriated other participants and forced a monthslong delay in the task force’s work.”
This is one example among many. Recently, many civil society organizations have raised concerns about growing influence of agribusiness interests at the FAO, which threatens to undermine years of progress in promoting global investments in agroecology.
Resources:
Probublica: Trump Town
Pruitt’s EPA ignores science, bows to Dow
EPA weakens safeguards for weedkiller atrazine